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David H. Close
Even though complete success is impossible, it is worth trying to see the
recent past from the perspective of the distant future. This task requires
one to identify and describe significant new trends in contemporary his-
tory. Those which became apparent in Greece in the 1990s are arguably
of special importance.
1989: DAWN OF A NEW ERA
The end of the Cold War
The new trends were in fact becoming apparent in 1989, and give one
the sense that an old era was closing and a new one beginning. One of
the trends, which had been under way during the previous three years,
was the ending of the Cold War. Since 1986 the Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev had pursued détente with the United States, while encour-
aging the peoples of the Soviet bloc to criticise their communist regimes.
In the latter endeavour he succeeded, as we now know, far beyond his
expectations. The resultant collapse of communist rule in much of the
Soviet bloc brought about terminal disillusionment in southern Europe
– except among a fringe of diehard communists – with socialism. The
decline of the regimes from 1986 onwards coincided with equally se-
vere disillusionment within Greece, for domestic reasons, with the rule
of the once professedly socialist party PASOK. This disillusionment led,
in turn, to a sharp drop in ideological tension between PASOK and the
chief opposition party, the right-wing New Democracy.
These changes enabled the parties to the left of PASOK (which in 1988
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formed a new party entitled the Coalition of the Left and of Progress) and
New Democracy to form a coalition government after the general elec-
tion of June 1989, with as one of its aims the burial of the hatreds of the
civil war of the 1940s, hatreds which had underlain the extraordinary ide-
ological passions of the first half of the 1980s. This task was attempted
in a solemn ceremony in parliament in August, followed by a reconcil-
iation law in September–October. The advocates of these measures
claimed justifiably that they were putting behind them the issues of a past
era, and clearing the way for the tasks of a new one.
The ending of the Cold War had other consequences for Greece. It
spelt the end of communist rule in the rest of the Balkans, and thus the
disappearance of the Iron Curtain which had since the 1940s separated
the region from Greece. The downfall of communism dissolved the
Yugoslav confederation and re-ignited ethnic tensions between its peo-
ples, tensions which affected the countries bordering former Yugoslavia
including Greece. As the economies of the communist systems fell apart,
vast numbers of their citizens emigrated to seek their livelihood in cap-
italist countries including Greece.
The ending of the Cold War had further implications for Greece. It
strengthened the international position of Turkey by changing and then
in 1991 destroying what had hitherto been Turkey’s chief potential enemy,
the Soviet Union. At the same time, in 1989, a constraint on the activi-
ties of the Turkish armed forces in the Aegean was removed by the EEC’s
rejection of Turkey’s application for candidacy for membership. Not being
obliged to impress the EEC any longer, Turkey ceased to fulfil the “spirit
of Davos” (the scene of a conciliatory meeting between the Greek and
Turkish prime ministers in 1988). As the Turkish armed forces were far
stronger than those of Greece, and the leaders of those armed forces vir-
tually dictated defence policy to civilian politicians, the consequences
of these changes were dangerous for Greece. There followed a long pe-
riod of heightened Turkish aggression against Greece in the Aegean Sea,
while the countries of western Europe were feeling more secure than at
any time since the 1920s.
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The over-sized and inefficient executive
What was arguably the most important domestic task facing Greek gov-
ernments became clear in mid-1989: preparation for accelerated integration
of the twelve member-countries of the European Economic Community
(EEC), of which Greece had been a full member since 1981. The details
of this process were agreed to by member governments at a summit
meeting in Madrid in June. In Greece, the need to participate in integration
seemed obvious to all politicians and most voters outside the Communist
Party. This was partly because of the country’s growing dependence on
trade with and subsidies from the EEC. It was also because Greece
needed friends in its confrontation with Turkey. In a deeper sense, inte-
gration with the EEC was a continuation of the pursuit of modernisation
in which political, business and intellectual elites had been engaged
since the birth of the modern state in the 1820s. They had since then be-
come accustomed to comparing Greek institutions and practices with those
of the developed countries of northern Europe and north America. To
an extraordinary extent in the next few years, politicians of all parties,
like journalists and intellectuals, were preoccupied with Greece’s apparent
backwardness. The task of modernisation was identified by all except
the Communists with assimilation with the EEC.
But it was also obvious that Greece in 1989 was woefully unprepared
for this process. The economy was stagnating, and public finances were
in a chaotic state, with a high budget deficit, hyper-inflation, and a moun-
tainous government debt, which necessitated the humiliating supervision
of the Greek Ministry of Finance by the European Commission and the
International Monetary Fund for much of the 1990s. PASOK departed
from power in 1989 after what was caustically named a “scorched-earth
strategy” of buying votes en masse, using money borrowed from the EEC.
One method of buying votes was to appoint people in tens of thousands
to secure jobs in the public service, without requiring qualifications, be-
fore the general election of June 1989. The size of government – in terms
of the percentage of GDP which it consumed, and the proportion of the
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labour force which it employed – reached unprecedented magnitude, a
fact with serious implications because most branches of the public ser-
vice, as well as most public utilities and state-controlled industries, had
been corrupted by partisan manipulation. Attainment of financial stability
would clearly require extensive improvements in the efficiency, and dras-
tic reduction in the size, of government. Particular attention would need
to be given to eliminating the deficits of state-controlled sectors of the
economy, and reform of the tax department so as to raise the necessary
revenues. For other reasons, too, the efficiency of government was an
issue of peculiar concern in 1989. Most people were exasperated with the
inadequacy of a wide range of state services that were essential to an in-
creasingly well-informed and urbanised society. Although an eternal sub-
ject of complaint in the media, the incapacity of the state provoked spe-
cial concern in this and the following few years. One reason is that
PASOK governments of 1981–89 had, in their pursuit of egalitarian ideals,
set aside considerations of merit not only in appointments but also in pro-
motions. While thus disabling the state administration, PASOK had raised
public expectations of it, particularly in the areas of health, education and
pensions. The inefficiency, or obstructiveness, of diverse services was
also harmful to the economy. Foreign businesses were hampered by red
tape and by the appalling telephone system. There was another category
of public problems – environmental – which had for some years caused
increasing concern, but seemed suddenly more critical and urgent. The
government showed little capacity to respond to them. It was not just the
ineffectiveness of government services which caused concern, but also
their corruption, a problem thrust on public attention by the scandals of
the PASOK regime.
What was also worrying about the PASOK regime was the extent of
its power. It was the first government in Greek history to be based on a
mass party organisation, which had proved formidably effective in
penetrating, or overawing, institutions which, it was generally agreed,
should in a modern democracy be independent of the government. These
included most branches of the public service including the police, the
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trade unions, various professional associations, the educational system,
voluntary organisations, elected local authorities, to a considerable ex-
tent the judiciary and to some extent the armed forces. The extraordinary
influence gained, not only by PASOK, but also by other parties, was
shown during the ten months of enforced inaction of businesses and trade
unions after the inconclusive election of June 1989. This power of the
parties seemed to threaten the democratic gains made by the restoration
of democracy in 1974. It also seemed to threaten the prospects of more
efficient government, given the way in which partisan manipulation had
damaged the state administration. It was yet another sign of the distance
which Greece had to travel in order to catch up with the democracies of
northern Europe and north America.
Yet there were encouraging moves towards devolution of powers,
which were already appearing in 1989. The Karamanlis government in
1977, in its reaction against the worst features of the post-civil war
regime, had enacted a new charter for the Church which guaranteed its
independence. The Church repeatedly demonstrated its independence in
the 1980s by attacks on PASOK measures which threatened its rights. The
PASOK government had been forced in 1987, by the initiative of an en-
terprising mayor of Athens belonging to New Democracy, to allow pri-
vate radio broadcasting. The natural sequel was provision in 1989 for
private television. Numerous non-government radio stations sprang into
existence in time to influence public discussion before the general elec-
tion of June 1989. Like the private television channels established in
1990, they immediately became far more popular than their state
counterparts. Newspapers were in the 1980s becoming more indepen-
dent of political parties and governments, and were being acquired by
business tycoons, who invested in new technology and ran them more
as commercial operations and less as party organs.
The appearance in the 1980s of hundreds of active and enthusiastic
environmental groups, independent of the parties, was a sign that civil
society was coming into existence in the liberal conditions and the in-
creasingly well-educated society which followed the transition from
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military dictatorship to democracy in 1974. At least one part of the ju-
diciary, the Council of State, had in the late 1980s started to defy the ex-
ecutive on environmental matters. In 1989 a government failed, for the
first time, to win a majority by court action on the executive of the main
trade union body, the General Confederation of Greek Workers. The po-
litical parties were losing their moral authority, as became fully appar-
ent before the general election of June 1989, when opinion polls showed
a much lower level of public enthusiasm for and commitment to the party
contest than before the previous election in 1985. As it turned out, this
was the beginning of a trend towards apathy and cynicism about polit-
ical parties, a trend which has continued to strengthen until 2000.
THEMES IN THE HISTORY OF THE 1990s
Entry into EMU
Successive governments had no choice about their chief priority dur-
ing the 1990s, because it was dictated to them by the European
Commission and the IMF: financial stabilisation so as to qualify for fur-
ther loans. Governments did however have some choice about the de-
gree to which they should take the stabilisation. The choice made both
by the New Democracy government of 1990–93 and the PASOK gov-
ernments since 1993 seemed at first to be hopelessly ambitious. It was
to fulfil the criteria set by the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 for entry
into the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU, popularly known as the
euro-zone). These criteria were a budget deficit no larger than 3 per cent
of GDP and an inflation rate close to the average of the European
Union (as the EEC became known from 1992). The goal was accepted
by the overwhelming majority of the public, who were no doubt im-
pressed by the several thousand construction projects co-financed by
the EU that were under way in Greece by the mid-1990s. Most of the
public was also attracted by the promised advantages of EMU mem-
bership: lower interest rates, greater attractiveness of the country to
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foreign investors, and a currency with greater prestige than the drachma.
Many people, however, displayed strong aversion to the harsh means
taken to achieve financial stabilisation: higher taxes and social security
contributions, reduced social security benefits, and high interest rates. The
harshness of the measures was intensified by the fact that the economy
stagnated for three years in 1990–93 (meaning that there was no growth
in wealth to accompany the continuing growth in population); while un-
employment rose throughout the decade to reach a level of 11.7 per cent
in 1999 – the second-highest in the European Union and still visibly ris-
ing. The majority of the population felt increasing reason to resent the
tyranny of the tax department as it succeeded in increasing public revenue.
There existed similar public resentment, for the same reasons, in the other
southern countries of the EU: Italy, Portugal, and Spain, which also suf-
fered in order to qualify for EMU membership. The resentment was, how-
ever, strongest in Greece, as proved by comparative opinion polls.
It is for this reason that the 1990s were marked by extraordinarily in-
tense protests against successive governments. They were especially
strong under the New Democracy government of April 1990 to October
1993, because its party supporters in the trade unions were outweighed
by supporters of the left-wing parties. The government also worsened its
difficulties by a socially provocative, neo-liberal or Thatcherite, ideology.
Consequently it had to face extremely widespread and prolonged strikes
and demonstrations. The PASOK governments, from October 1993 to
now, benefited from the support of a majority of the trade union move-
ment, which helped and encouraged those governments to attain a
greater degree of social consensus in their austerity policies. But they too
had to face demonstrations of unprecedented scale from various groups
including farmers, who in two successive winters (1995–96 and 1996–97)
blocked several arterial highways for weeks on end. The policies of
PASOK governments provoked widespread resentment from their old sup-
porters, resentment which led to serious divisions in the party and a large-
scale shift in the party’s electoral support from low income groups to
higher income groups.
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The prospects of success in financial stabilisation became brighter from
the mid-1990s onwards. Inflation fell in 1995 below double digits – for
the first time since 1972 – and continued to decline thereafter. The size
of the budget deficit was declining, although it had not disappeared even
by 2000. The present government (January 2001) promises in 2001 the
first budget surplus since 1966.
Successive governments since 1990 have proclaimed their determi-
nation to reduce drastically the size of the state sector of the economy,
in conformity with the rest of Europe. They have been strongly and gen-
erally criticised for their unimpressive achievements in this respect. Yet
progress was made and is continuing. The size of public utilities, in terms
of fixed capital and employment, was gradually declining as they were
sold, in whole or in part. The total numbers of people employed by the
state and by state-owned sectors of the economy were declining as a pro-
portion of the national labour force. State employment was not, admit-
tedly, declining in absolute terms. This is because certain sectors of the
public service – schools, local government, and the police – genuinely
needed additional staff. It was however only these sectors which were
growing, while some other parts of the public service actually experienced
staff shortages in the late 1990s. (Of course they might not have been
short of staff had they managed to improve their efficiency.)
The quality of new appointees to the public service was improving,
and the scope for party patronage was declining, as a result of the pro-
gressive implementation of the Peponis Law of 1994, which established
an independent administrative authority, the Supreme Council for the
Selection of Personnel, to supervise competitive examinations for entry
into public employment. One sector of the public service became notably
more effective, largely as a result of computerisation: the tax department;
and this change accounts largely for the great increase in revenues in re-
cent years.
After Kostas Simitis became prime minister in January 1996, his gov-
ernment made loudly advertised efforts, which still continue, to improve
government services to the public. One of Simitis’s achievements – against
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strong opposition within his government – was the establishment of the
ombudsman in 1998. This office received the remarkable total of over
6000 complaints during its first year of operation in 1999, a large pro-
portion of which were resolved by decisions favourable to the com-
plainants. Certain public utilities became distinctly more efficient from
the mid-1990s onwards, notably the telephone service. A survey of cit-
izens’ satisfaction with public utilities in the countries of the EU in 2000
actually found higher-than-average levels of satisfaction in Greece
with the services responsible for telephones, water, postage, and public
transport. Here are signs that the notorious inefficiency and arrogance of
officialdom were at last being remedied.
Although there was constant lamentation during the 1990s over the
extent of corruption in the public service, it may well be the strength of
criticism that was unprecedented rather than the extent of corruption.
A long-term survey shows a decline in the number of prosecutions of
officials since the 1950s, despite the growing number of officials. The
author concludes by suggesting, plausibly, that there is an inverse re-
lationship between levels of corruption and levels of economic devel-
opment, and a positive relationship between levels of criticism and levels
of development. In other words, the higher the level of development, the
less the corruption but the more the criticism (Koutsoukis, 1998:150–54).
Politicians evidently became more circumspect after the loudly adver-
tised trials of PASOK ministers and public officials in 1989–92. The one
exception was Andreas Papandreou, and he finally retired in January
1996. International surveys by the much respected research organisation
Transparency International rated Greece in the 1990s as less corrupt than
Italy or the eastern European countries.
Revival of economic growth in 1994 enabled progress towards fi-
nancial stabilisation to continue. The overall growth rate of GDP from
1994 to 2000 has in fact been higher than the EU average, and enabled
Greece to make some progress towards the official EU goal of conver-
gence with the EU average in GDP per capita. In 1999 Greece reached
a level of 69 per cent of the EU average, which represented a distinct
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improvement but was still behind all other EU member countries.
So Greece ceased to be what it had been early in the decade: the in-
valid of the EU. One reason for the recovery was the vast and growing
scale of EU subsidies, which were devoted especially to physical infra-
structure but also to a wide variety of other purposes. Perhaps the best-
known and most-needed product of EU subsidies is the splendid Athens
Metro, which opened during the year 2000. Other constructions to fol-
low soon are the Via Egnatia (the motorway linking Turkey to the
Adriatic) and the giant Elevtherios Venizelos airport outside Athens,
which is scheduled to receive visitors to the 2004 Olympic Games.
Another reason for recovery is that Greek industrialists had succeeded
in adapting to EU competition. They were also taking advantage, from
about 1993, of the growing investment and market opportunities in the
post-communist Balkans. They were helped by an improvement in the
climate for investment in Greece from the mid-1990s, as the rate of in-
flation and the rate of industrial unrest declined to levels not known since
the early 1970s. One sign of the improvement of the climate for business
was the striking growth of the Athens Stock Exchange, which for the first
time became an important source of credit for business. Admittedly, it
entered a prolonged slump in September 1999 after an unhealthily spec-
ulative boom. But, in view of the profitability of the listed companies,
it is expected by expert observers (in January 2001) to recover soon.
Eligibility for entry into EMU was triumphantly attained in June 2000,
to the applause of people right across the political spectrum (except of
course the unregenerate Communist Party, which had parted company
with the left-wing modernisers in the Coalition Party in 1991, when
Gorbachev was losing power). Even the Archbishop of Athens – who was
in 2000 militantly defending traditional values against the govern-
ment-led campaign to catch up with western Europe – congratulated the
government on acceptance into EMU, which is scheduled to result in re-
placement of the drachma by the euro in 2002. This general reaction was
due to more than the material benefits which could be expected from
EMU membership. Entry into EMU was seen as proof that Greece was
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recognised by western Europe as an advanced and modern nation.
One advantage of this status was shown at the Helsinki meeting of EU
governments in December 1999, which admitted Turkey as candidate for
ultimate EU membership, but on conditions which in essentials endorsed
Greek views about Turkish aggression. Turkey was required to make sat-
isfactory progress towards democratic practices – which would in-
clude the withdrawal of the army from politics – and peacefully settle its
disputes with Greece over sovereign rights in the Aegean.
Emancipation of society from government
The emancipation from government of various sectors of society con-
tinued. Although PASOK retained great influence over trade unions
through its party organisation, governments of both parties ceased try-
ing to dominate the executive of the General Confederation of Greek
Workers (GCGW), by using pliant courts of law to nullify elections of
opponents. Moreover, the state withdrew from the process of collective
bargaining by a law of 1990 which abolished a long-standing provision
for compulsory arbitration. Thenceforth negotiations between the GCGW
and its chief counterpart among employers, the Confederation of Greek
Industries, were increasingly independent of governments. The GCGW
has become a powerful and independent pressure group, with enough in-
dependence, for example, to influence government treatment of illegal
immigrants.
The court of appeals against the public administration, the Council of
State, also displayed new independence from the late 1980s, and fre-
quently defied the government in the 1990s by its rulings on environ-
mental protection. Increased independence was increasingly shown by
other sectors of the judiciary as well. For example, in 2000 public pros-
ecutors reported findings to parliamentary committees that were very
damaging to certain government ministers, who in response attacked the
prosecutors, but were much criticised for doing so. In general, however,
governments have been showing increasing respect for the independence
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of the judiciary and for the rulings of courts.
Voluntary organisations – usually referred to as non-government or-
ganisations or NGOs – became noticeably more active and influential in
many fields in the 1990s, for example environmental protection, assis-
tance to immigrants, assistance to disabled children and battered women,
protection of human rights and protection of consumers. Those running
the organisations were generally skilful in making use of the media, from
which they often received favourable publicity. They also made frequent
use of courts of law, including the increasingly influential European Court
of Human Rights. Until the start of the 1990s the normal attitude of gov-
ernments to NGOs was antagonistic or domineering. But a change of at-
titude was apparent by 1996, when the Ministry of the Environment con-
ducted and published a thorough survey of incorporated environmental
organisations. From that time onwards, the attitude of government
ministers to NGOs was increasingly appreciative and cooperative. A com-
prehensive government survey in 2000 recorded about 3,500 NGOs in
a wide range of fields – evidence of expansion, which the government
now welcomed.
From 1994 PASOK governments took major steps, with much pub-
lic approval, to strengthen elected local authorities. In that year, the gov-
ernment made prefects and their advisory councils democratically elec-
tive and so more independent of the national executive. In 1997 a reform
was enacted which had the effect of making the municipalities the sec-
ond-most important tier of government. This is commonly referred to as
the “Capodistria Programme”, which more than doubled the number of
municipalities by amalgamating several thousand village communes.
Since the late 1970s the financial resources and the responsibilities of mu-
nicipalities had greatly increased, and an increasing proportion of these
resources were guaranteed, and therefore placed beyond ministerial dis-
cretion. Municipalities received some funding directly from the EU,
through which they also made useful contacts with counterparts from
other countries. Presumably the PASOK government intended, when em-
barking on its programme of decentralisation in 1994, to retain control
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of local authorities through its party organisation. It was disappointed,
because the prefects and mayors showed increasing independence of the
parties, and gained popularity by doing so. Many – apparently the great
majority – of them showed such independence in the local elections of
1998 (Lyrintzis, 2000:12–20). Local authorities are, therefore, another
interest group which governments are obliged increasingly to consult
when formulating policies.
Re-joining the Balkans
In the early 1990s, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was so accustomed
to a low level of contact with other Balkan countries that it was unpre-
pared to respond to the sudden disappearance of the Iron Curtain. In this
neglect, the ministry represented Greek society as a whole. For exam-
ple, a politician who was about to become Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Mihaili Papakonstantinou, pointed out in a letter to a newspaper in June
1992 that the languages of neighbouring countries were hardly being taught
at all in Greece (Vima, 7 June 1992: A22).
For fear of contact between the Muslims of Thrace and their counter-
parts in Bulgaria, the government for some time continued to restrict the
number of border crossing-points. The attitude of the public to Albania was
at first dominated by bewildered resentment of a flood of illegal immigrants,
anger at the mistreatment of the ethnic Greeks in Albania, and – on the part
of some in Greece – atavistic territorial claims on “Northern Epirus” or
southern Albania. The reaction of many people to the declaration of in-
dependent statehood in 1991 by the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia
verged on hysteria. Unfortunately, public pressure was strong enough to
force the hand of successive governments, with the result that for 18 months
(February 1994 to September 1995) Andreas Papandreou’s government
enforced a pointless economic embargo on this feeble state, which it could
have been turning into a friendly satellite.
During 1995, the official attitude to the Balkan neighbours became more
constructive. Agreement was reached with what was now becoming
99
NEW TRENDS IN GREECE IN THE 1990s
greek studies english.qxd  04/09/01  21:32  Page 99
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
known as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), which
abandoned the symbol of the ancient Macedonian monarchy on its flag
and deleted words in its constitution which might imply claims on Greek
territory. (These terms could have been attained without fuss three years
earlier.) Since then, interchange of people and goods has greatly increased
and official relations have been friendly, even though no final agreement
has been reached on the name of the new state. The discrimination and
isolation formerly experienced by those in northern Greece who speak
Slav Macedonian has declined or disappeared.
Also in 1995, the Greek police cooperated with their Albanian
counterparts in checking the activities of Greek extremists who had been
operating in Albania using Greek territory, and the Greek government
reached greater understanding with the Albanian government over the
treatment of ethnic Greeks, many of whom had in any case migrated into
Greece. Interchange of goods and people with Bulgaria also increased
substantially. For the first time since 1945, the army abandoned control
over movement of people in the frontier zone bordering the three
Balkan neighbours.
In cultivating relations with Balkan countries, the government was fol-
lowing the lead taken since about 1993 or earlier by private entrepreneurs,
who in increasing numbers found markets and investments in them. By
1996, trade with the rest of the Balkans was running at twice the level
of 1992, and was steadily increasing as the economies of several Balkan
countries started to recover from the collapse of communism. By 2000
about 3,500 Greek companies had invested in total nearly $3.4 billions
in Balkan countries (Kathimerini, 10 November 2000, English internet
edition), and were positioned to take advantage of the economic growth
which can reasonably be expected as the Balkan governments establish
secure conditions for business and learn how to manage capitalist
economies. Greece has taken a prominent role in conferences, some be-
tween heads of government and others at lower official levels, to discuss
various means of improving Balkan cooperation, especially in regard to
trade, telecommunications, and military security. Conferences have
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been held between special-interest groups from Balkan countries: jurists,
filmmakers, human rights and environmental activists. The establishment
of at least two new departments of Balkan studies at Greek universities
(in addition to the long-established Institute for Balkan Studies at the
University of Salonika), and the promised establishment of a department
of Turkish studies at the University of Athens, indicate growing inter-
est in the culture of neighbouring countries.
Greek governments, and official and unofficial organisations, have
found themselves qualified to take a leading role in initiatives for
Balkan cooperation because their country possesses those blessings to
which the other Balkan countries aspire: a mature parliamentary democ-
racy, a long-established and comparatively well-regulated capitalist
economy, and membership of the European Union and NATO. Although
in terms of material welfare the Greek people are (by conventional cri-
teria) still well below those of northern Europe, they are far ahead of the
other Balkan peoples. In terms of economic and military strength,
Greece is actually stronger than the rest of the Balkans combined. Thus
it was able to contribute substantial funds to the Balkan Stability Pact pro-
gramme, established on American and EU initiative after the end of the
NATO war against the new Yugoslavia in June 1999. Greece can be ex-
pected to benefit greatly from the ending of the United Nations embargo
against the new Yugoslavia since the downfall of President Slobodan
Milosevic in October 2000. Because most of the Greek people were
known to be strongly opposed to the NATO bombing of Serbia in
March–May 1999, the Greek government was well placed thereafter to
mediate between Yugoslavia and the western powers.
Towards a multicultural society
One form of reintegration with the Balkans was involuntary: the mixture
of peoples caused by uncontrollable mass immigration. In the 1980s thou-
sands of immigrants began to arrive from Poland and then from the
Soviet Union, the latter consisting of nearly 90,000 ethnic Greeks. The
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flow of immigrants turned into an uncontrollable flood in 1991 with the
opening up of the Albanian border. There has in addition been a con-
siderable influx of people from the Middle East, Asia and different parts
of northern Africa. Voluntary associations such as the Greek branch of
Médecins sans Frontières estimated the total number of immigrants in
1999 as 800,000 or nearly 8 per cent of the national population, the ma-
jority being from Albania, though a portion of those from Albania were
ethnic Greeks. After three years of strenuous official attempts to legalise
this multitude of immigrants, the majority still have no official status.
According to official figures, 6.5 per cent of children in primary and sec-
ondary schools in 2000 had immigrant parents, and one-third of these
children were ethnic Greeks (whose parents were presumably more
likely to send them to schools in Greece).
Given the scale and uncontrolled character of this influx, it is not sur-
prising that the levels of public resentment against immigrants should be
high – in fact the highest among EU countries, according to cross-coun-
try surveys. The universal belief in Greece that immigrants are respon-
sible for a collapse of security and order helps to account for the re-
sentment, even though the belief is not supported by the proportion of
immigrants among the total number of people arrested and jailed by po-
lice. But it is also significant that about as many people in Greece say
that they do not resent the presence of foreigners as those who say that
they do (Ta Nea, 28 January 1998:1). This division of opinion can be ex-
plained by the immense value of cheap immigrant labour to an economy
in which small-scale, low-cost family businesses are exceptionally nu-
merous. Indeed, government ministers admit that immigrant labour is now
vital to agriculture. Immigrant women even provide wives to Greek farm-
ers, as Greek women have voted with their feet on the traditional hard-
ships of rural life. Another strong source of support for immigrants con-
sists of human rights and charitable organisations. Human rights
organisations have embarrassed the government by appealing to the
European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations High
Commission on Refugees.
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A large proportion of immigrants are well educated. In fact their ed-
ucational level is as high as that of the native population. This fact helps
to explain why they have become well organised and articulate, as shown
by the fact that since 1997 there have occurred four annual multicultural
festivals in Athens, in each of which scores of immigrant groups have
participated.
So Greece has suddenly ceased to be an ethnically or culturally ho-
mogeneous society. Current indications are that the majority of the pub-
lic are likely to become in time considerably more tolerant of – or at least
resigned to – this change.
Turkey: a turning point?
Greece and Turkey continued for most of the 1990s to disagree heatedly
over air space and territorial waters around Aegean islands, and the
Greek militarisation of eastern Aegean islands. Tension over the parti-
tion of Cyprus also continued, and reached a new level in 1996 with the
killing of five civilians along the demarcation line, followed by the
Greek-Cypriot purchase of anti-aircraft missiles from Russia. Yet another
and still more alarming cause for dispute arose in January 1996, with the
Turkish claim to the islets known in Greek as Ta Imia close to the Turkish
coast, followed by challenges, made by Turkish military figures, against
the sovereignty of other Aegean islands. In early 1999, relations between
Greece and Turkey still seemed about as bad as they ever had been since
the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July–August 1974.
Then they suddenly improved, after the earthquakes in Turkey and
Greece in August–September 1999. Public feeling between the two coun-
tries was transformed by the sight on television of Greek and Turkish res-
cue teams working side by side in the rubble in both countries. Here is
further evidence of the power of the TV image. But what was at least as
significant was the eagerness of the two governments to take advantage
of the new climate of opinion. The Greek government, led since January
1996 by Kostas Simitis, had avoided the demagogic nationalism of his
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predecessor Andreas Papandreou and tried to improve relations with
neighbouring countries, presumably in the hope of enabling the country
eventually to reduce its defence expenditure, which was extraordinarily
high (by the standards of EU and NATO countries) in relation to GDP.
With a normal defence burden, Greece could probably have spent more
desperately needed money on its social services and economic infra-
structure, besides joining Economic and Monetary Union at the same time
as other EU countries. The Turkish government needed to improve re-
lations with Greece, because it was preparing to apply once more to be
admitted as a candidate for membership of the EU, a goal which was seen
as more desirable than ever by dominant sections of opinion in Turkey
including the armed forces. Simitis’s support for Turkish candidacy at
the Helsinki summit conference in December 1999 was a shrewd de-
parture from previous policy. No longer could Greece be blamed for ob-
structing Turkish membership. If there was any further delay, blame
would be likely to stick instead to the Turkish military for obstructing
progress towards the conditions for membership required by the EU.
In the fifteen months since the earthquakes, the new climate of rela-
tions between Greece and Turkey has continued, although marred by at
least two squalls. While showing no disposition to abandon any of their
former claims, the Turkish military leaders have also shown a desire to
maintain good relations with Greece and with the EU – a point apparently
overlooked by nationalist critics of Simitis in Greece. Nine agreements
have been signed between the two countries on relatively non-contro-
versial but valuable matters including the promotion of trade and
tourism, the control of immigration and the suppression of terrorism.
Trade, investment, and tourist traffic between the two countries have
greatly increased. Turkish violations of Greek airspace have greatly de-
clined. When the EU expands eastwards – as it is expected to do in a few
years with the admission of eleven eastern European countries – Turkey’s
need for EU membership and therefore for Greek friendship is likely to
increase. In time it might even be possible for Greece to reduce its de-
fence budget.
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CONCLUSIONS
This brief survey indicates that Greece has made impressive progress in
the 1990s towards convergence with the better features of western lib-
eral democracies. Governments have learnt to show greater respect for
the law, and greater readiness to consult with other interest groups.
Partly in consequence, political power has become more decentralised
and civil society has become stronger. People in Greece have become more
interested in neighbouring countries, and more accustomed to living
with immigrants of different cultures. Relations with neighbouring coun-
tries have improved, for reasons which give ground for hope that the im-
provement will continue. The economy has become more competitive with
those of western Europe. In various ways, the national government and
public utilities have become more efficient.
At the same time, adhesion to the most valuable of national traditions
remains strong. According to international surveys, Greece has stronger
family values and a lower crime rate than any of the other fourteen EU
countries, and is the only western country (that is, one that has not ex-
perienced a communist regime) in which religiosity has increased in the
last twenty years. This trend might be explained by the partial recovery
of the Church from the discredit which it suffered from association with
the post-civil war regime before 1974. The Church seems likely to ben-
efit, also, from a current change of generations at the top, and in particular
from the succession of the popular Christodoulos in May 1998 to the po-
sition of Archbishop of Athens.
If one concluded that the dominant mood in Greece is optimistic, one
would however be wrong. Most people in Greece are habituated by EU
surveys to compare their situation with that of other EU countries, not
with that of their neighbours. Successive surveys of EU countries in re-
cent years found that Greece and Portugal had the highest proportions
of people who believed that their circumstances had deteriorated in re-
cent years, and reporting themselves to be dissatisfied with life. They also
showed that economic inequality (specifically the ratio of the highest
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twenty per cent in income to the lowest twenty per cent) was greatest in
Greece and Portugal, which were also the poorest countries in GDP per
capita. Taking all the surveys together, one gets the impression that con-
ditions were worst in Greece, which had the lowest GDP per capita, the
highest proportion of people reporting that they had difficulty in mak-
ing ends meet, and the longest working hours. There is serious and ob-
viously justifiable dissatisfaction with social services – especially edu-
cation, health and social insurance. The dissatisfaction seems to be due
more to rising public expectations than to declining standards.
Nevertheless, appeasing it seems to be the most difficult challenge now
facing the government.
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